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ILLINOIS TORT REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO JUVENILE
VICTIMS OF RESIDENTIAL LEAD POISONING
The United States is in the midst of an epidemic more prevalent
than polio before the Salk vaccine, and which leaves more children per-
manently impaired than did German measles before the vaccination pro-
grams. The name of this epidemic is lead poisoning.
Lead poisoning is not new. It is one of the oldest known envi-
ronmental poisons. Lead poisoning may have caused the fall of the
Roman Empire. The Roman aristocracy aged its wine in lead utensils
which the poor could not afford and, as a consequence, suffered sterility,
mental impairment, and death, while the lower classes survived because
they could not afford these "luxury" utensils.' Lead poisoning still kills,
but today its victims are chiefly the poor and the young. It affects
the poor because they live in the badly maintained older buildings where
lead paint is widely used. It affects the young because they have a natural
tendency to put any available object in their mouths, especially the
sweet-tasting lead chips. Lead-based paint poisons 400,000 children an-
nually. Of these, 16,000 will require treatment, 3,200 will suffer mod-
erate to severe brain damage, 800 will be "vegetables" for the remainder
of their lives, and 200 will die. 2  Children between one and three
years of age comprise 85% of all reported cases, and two-year old children
account for more than 50% of all lead poisoning deaths. 3  In Chicago,
according to 1970 figures published by the Chicago Board of Health, 3,715
children had "elevated bloods, ' 4 478 had lead poisoning, and 5 died. In
1971, 4,933 had elevated bloods, 610 had lead poisoning, and 4 died.5
The cost of lead poisoning is steep. A case of only moderate brain
damage costs $1,750 per child per year for special instruction and other care,
for a period of about 10 years. Thus, the care of 3,200 who suffer only mod-
erate damage is $5,600,000 annually. Lifetime institutionalization of the 800
severely brain damaged children costs $4,000 per year or $3,200,000. This,
added to the cost of maintaining past victims makes the amount incalculable.
Lifetime institutionalization can cost more than $200,000 for one child.6
1. Gilfillan, Lead Poisoning and the Fall of Rome, 7 Journal of Occupational
Medicine 53 (1965).
2. Lin-Fu, Lead Poisoning in Children, United States Department of Health,
Education and Welfare, Pub. No. 452 Children's Bureau (1967).
3. 117 Cong. Rec. 139 (1971) (remarks of Hon. William F. Ryan).
4. Indicating undue lead absorption, but not necessarily lead poisoning.




Lead poisoning is paid for by its victims in wasted lives 7 and by taxpayers
for care of its victims. Seemingly, the only ones who benefit are the land-
lords who have saved the expense of repair.
The tragedy of childhood lead poisoning is compounded by the
fact that it is utterly preventable through screening programs, strict code
enforcement, or other means. The purpose of this article is to dis-
cuss some theories of recovery against landlords which hopefully may
serve as a deterrent to lead poisoning in the future.
LIABILITY OF LANDLORDS FOR INJURIES OCCURRING IN THE COMMON AREAS
For injuries occurring in the common areas, 8 i.e., those used by
more than one tenant, the landlord is generally responsible. Such areas
include stairways, passageways, cellarways, roofs, basements, and exterior
walls. 9  The landlord's responsibility extends to tenants, social visitors,
and all those lawfully on the premises. 10 In these common areas, the
landlord has the duty of exercising reasonable care to keep the premises in
a reasonably safe condition, and if he neglects to do so, he is liable for
injury proximately resulting to persons lawfully on the premises."
LIABILITY OF LANDLORDS FOR INJURIES OCCURRING IN THE PRIVATE AREAS
The liability of the landlord for injuries occurring in the private
areas exclusively within the control of the tenant is more difficult to
prove than liability for injuries occurring in the common areas. In Il-
linois, the general rule of caveat emptor applies to private areas (or, as
often referred to, caveat rentor). However, there are several methods of
circumventing the harsh rule of caveat emptor which would be of use in a
lead poisoning case, including landlord's duty to disclose a latent de-
fect, landlord's duty to a child, and violation of statute as evidence of negli-
gence, all of which will be discussed below.
Duty to Disclose a Latent Defect
In Illinois, a landlord has the duty to disclose a dangerous defect
7. "It will be interesting to speculate how many children from the ghetto who
are minimal brain damage syndrome or hyperkinetic syndrome or whatever, have
really subclinical lead poisoning." Remarks by Dr. Ronald B. Mack at the University
of Illinois Symposium on "Pediatric Lead Poisoning, The Silent Menace," June 16, 1971.
8. As to what comprises a 'common area' the factors are the intention of the
parties, the terms of the lease, and responsibility for repairs, maintenance and illumina-
tion. Gula v. Gawel, 71 Ill. App. 2d 174, 218 N.E.2d 42 (1966).
9. Finesilver v. Caporusso, I Ill. App. 3d 450, 274 N.E.2d 905 (1971); Meiners
v. Moyer, 119 Ill. App. 2d 94, 255 N.E.2d 201 (1970); Greenlee Bros. & Co. v. Rock-
ford Chair and Furniture Company, 107 Ill. App. 2d 326, 246 N.E.2d 64 (1969).
10. Meiners v. Moyer, 119 111. App. 2d 94, 255 N.E.2d 201 (1970); Gula v.
Gawel, 71 111. App. 2d 174, 218 N.E.2d 42 (1966).
11. Manns v. Stein, 99 111. App. 2d 398, 241 N.E.2d 691 (1968).
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existing at the time of the leasing, known to him or of which he should
have known in the exercise of reasonable care, which the tenant could not
discover by a reasonable examination of the premises.1 2  Failure to dis-
close a latent defect makes the landlord liable for injuries caused by the
defect. In lead poisoning cases an argument can be made that no ten-
ant, no matter how carefully he inspects, could know if the walls of an
apartment contained lead-based paint. If the landlord knew or should
have known that the walls contained lead paint, the landlord must disclose
this or be liable for any injury. The difficulty lies in proving that the
landlord knew or should have known that the walls contained lead paint.
In Acosta v. Irdank Realty Corp.,1" a New York lead poisoning case,
the court said the defendant landlord was charged with the knowledge by
the existence of an ordinance banning the continued use of lead paint:
It is not claimed the defendant violated the terms of this sec-
tion, nor do I find that it did. I merely cite this provision
of the law to show that the defendant should have known that
the paint on the walls of this apartment contained lead which
might be harmful to the occupants of the apartment. 1 4  (Em-
phasis supplied.)
Duty of Landlord to a Child
Irrespective of whether the injury occurs in the common areas or
the private areas, the landlord owes a special duty to a child under Illi-
nois law. A leading Illinois case on the duty owed a child is Kahn v.
James Burton Company." In this case an 11-year old child was injured
while playing on lumber stacked without proper support on the land of a
third party. The defendant lumber company was neither in possession nor
control of the premises at the time of the injury, nor was any evidence
presented that the defendant had any knowledge that children played on the
premises. In holding the defendant liable for injuries to the child, the court
said:
The creator of certain conditions dangerous and hazardous
to children because of their immature appreciation of such dan-
gers and hazards must be held to a certain standard of con-
duct for the protection of such children in accordance with the
attendant circumstances and conditions. Account must be
taken of the cost and burden of taking precautionary measures
and of the right of families and society to rear and develop
children with freedom of activity in their communities, with-
out being subject to unreasonable risks which might cause se-
rious injury or death to such children. 16
12. Thorson v. Aronson, 122 Ill. App. 2d 156, 258 N.E.2d 33 (1970).
13. 238 N.Y.S.2d 713.
14. ld. at 714.
15. 5 Il. 2d 614, 126 N.E.2d 836 (1955).
16. Id. at 622, 126 N.E.2d at 840.
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The defendant's actual knowledge is not important; the point is he
should have known there was danger to a child. The test becomes one of
foreseeability:
The element of attraction is significant only in so far as it in-
dicates that the trespass should be anticipated, the true basis of
liability being the foreseeability of harm to the child.1 7 (Em-
phasis supplied.)
The Kahn decision was heavily relied upon in the recent Illinois
case of Rahn v. Beurskens,18 a suit for injuries sustained by a 15-month
old boy when he grasped a defective outside electrical wire with one
hand and a water faucet with the other. The injury occurred in a house
leased by the child's father. Sometime after the commencement of the
tenancy, the landlord had been notified of the defective wire and had prom-
ised to repair it. The defendant landlord maintained he could not be
liable for defects on the leased premises unless the plaintiff established:
(1) that defendant retained possession of that part of the prem-
ises where the injury occurred;
(2) or that the defect was latent;
(3) or that the defendant had actual knowledge of such defect at
the time of the letting and concealed it from the tenant;
(4) or that any agreement to repair was entered into at the in-
ception of the lease.' 9
The plaintiff conceded that none of these factors was present in this case.
The court said that ordinarily the above factors would have been a
prerequisite to liability had it not been for the age of the plaintiff. The
court stated the test for liability in cases involving children was not the above
four factors, but:
(1) that the wiring was in a defective condition at the time of
the leasing;
(2) that the defendant knew or should have known it;
(3) that defendant knew that the young children frequented the
vicinity;
(4) that he knew small children would not understand or ap-
preciate the danger;
(5) that injury to person or property was reasonably fore-
seeable from its condition .... 20
The above language could easily be adapted to a case involving lead poi-
soning. To reiterate, it is not the actual knowledge of the defendant
that is important. The defendant's promise to repair the defective wire
and his actual knowledge of the defect were not the decisive factors in
Rahn. The test is one of foreseeability of conditions which can lead to
harm when small children are involved.
17. Id. at 625, 126 N.E.2d at 842.
18. 66 111. App. 2d 423, 213 N.E.2d 301 (1966).
19. Id. at 425, 213 N.E.2d at 302.
20. Id. at 427, 213 N.E.2d at 303.
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The defendant in Rahn further contended that because the minor
child was a member of the lessee's family, he stood in the shoes of his father
and the defendant owed no greater duty to the child than he owed to the
father. In rejecting this defense, the court stated that the basis of liability
is the foreseeability of harm to children, not the status of the child in relation
to the landlord:
It is not the status of the creator of the dangerous instrumen-
tality as lessor, lessee, owner, or possessor or one in control that
determines the liability to a small child, but, irrespective of
status, the test is whether danger to a child or children is rea-
sonably foreseeable by the creator of such instrumentality.21
(Emphasis supplied.)
The court said that the landlord does not thus become an insurer of
children against all risks, but that the landlord's conduct "is to be weighed
on the theory that he will not neglect a condition which the common ex-
perience of man teaches is dangerous with injury therefore reasonably
foreseeable."' 22  At least one lead poisoning case has decided that it is
within the "common experience of man" to foresee the danger to chil-
dren from lead paint:
That small children go around the house picking up everything
within their reach and placing it in their mouths and attempting
to eat it is well known. They often have a craving to put in
their mouths and eat most unusual things. It would not be
unreasonable, therefore, to foresee that Yvette would pick up
pieces of plaster and paint if they were lying around and eat
them. On the other hand, it is well known that paint contains
lead which may cause lead poisoning to anyone ingesting it.23
Because the Rahn decision specifically refuses to place the child in the
shoes of the parents, the defense of non-payment of rent, exculpatory clauses
in the lease, or a showing of contributory negligence by the parents should
have no effect in a suit by the child. A defense of contributory negligence
on the part of the child eating the paint would scarcely be encountered in
Illinois because there is a presumption that a child under seven is not re-
sponsible for his own acts, and almost all the victims of lead poisoning
are under seven. Contributory negligence on the part of the parents may,
however, be a defense if the parents are suing on their own behalf
seeking recovery for the child's death. Their negligence must, however,
be more than a mere failure to maintain a constant watch over the child.24
21. Id. at 430, 213 N.E.2d at 305.
22. ld. at 429, 213 N.E.2d at 304.
23. Acosta v. Irdank Realty Corp., 238 N.Y.S.2d 713, 714 (1963).
24. "The law does not require that persons in their station of life shall keep con-
stant watch over their children, nor can the want of such care be imputed to them as
negligent conduct." Crutchfield v. Meyer, 414 Ill. 210, 213, 111 N.E.2d 142, 143
(1953). The parents in this case were working people.
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Violation of Statute as Evidence of Negligence
The City of Chicago has a strong law regarding lead poisoning
which can be used as evidence of a standard of care. The Chicago Munici-
pal Code provides that:
Every floor, interior wall and ceiling shall be kept in sound
condition and good repair, and further,
(c) Every interior wall and ceiling shall be free of holes and
large cracks.
(d) All interior walls, ceilings and interior woodwork shall
be free of flaking, peeling, chipped or loose paint, plaster or
structural material.25
The Chicago Municipal Code further provides:
Effective July 1, 1972, it shall be unlawful for any person to sell,
offer for sale, for use, or to use or apply lead based coatings or
toxic heavy metal based coatings in or upon:
1. Any exposed surface of any dwelling or dwelling unit; or
2. Any fixtures or other objects used, installed in or upon any
exposed surface of any dwelling or dwelling unit, or intended
to be so used, installed, or located. 26
Once injury has occurred, the Chicago Lead Poisoning Ordinance can
be a useful tool in a suit for damages. Under Illinois law violation
of a statute or ordinance, designed to protect human life, is prima
facie evidence of negligence.27  The plaintiff must show that he comes
within the purview of the particular ordinance or statute and the injury
has a direct and proximate connection with the violation.28  There is
ample authority in Illinois for viewing tenants as within the class of
persons designed to be benefited and protected by the Chicago Housing
Code. For example, in Gula v. Gawel,29 a suit against the landlord
to recover for injuries incurred on an unlit stairway, the court said:
The provisions of the Housing Code concern themselves in
a large extent with the conditions of premises leased to tenants,
and the condition of such premises has an obvious connection
with the health and safety of the tenant-occupant. A tenant is
clearly within the class of persons designed to be benefited and
protected by the Code (Emphasis supplied).
The Code imposes the obligation upon the landlord to refrain
from letting or holding out to another for occupancy any
dwelling . . . which does not meet the standards set out by the
25. Chicago Municipal Code ch. 78, § 78-17.2. See also Chicago Municipal Code
ch. 100, § 29.3 dealing with the sale of lead based paint.
26. Chicago Municipal Code ch. 78, § 78-17.2.
27. Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960).
28. Gula v. Gawel, 71111. App. 2d 174, 182, 218 N.E.2d 42, 46 (1966).
29. Id.
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Code. . . The Housing Code thus establishes a duty of care
based upon contemporary conditions, values and norms of conduct
in this community30 (Emphasis supplied).
The above language indicates clearly that the Housing Code is de-
signed to protect tenants; that anyone who incurs lead poisoning from
premises in violation of the Housing Code is within the class of persons
intended to be covered, and proof of a violation is therefore prima
facie evidence of negligence. 31
Several state statutes affect lead poisoning, the most significant of which
deals with criminal housing management.3 2  The law provides a penalty not
to exceed one year, or a fine not to exceed $1,000, or both. The statute
is aimed at legal or equitable owners, managing agents, or anyone having
personal management or control of residential real estate who knowingly
allows, by gross carelessness or neglect, the building to deteriorate to the
point that it endangers the health or safety of any inhabitant. The statute
could be used in lead poisoning cases, although it has not been to date.3 3
Other Illinois statutes pertinent to discussion of lead poisoning include a
statute requiring the labeling of paint3 4 and a statute permitting owners or
tenants within 500 feet of any property maintained in violation of a local
ordinance, to prevent the occupancy of the building or to correct the viola-
tion.3 5
30. Id. at 174, 218 N.E.2d at 46.
31. An alternative would be to assert that the violation of statute is negligence
per se, meaning the tenant need only show violation of the statute; proof of negli-
gence is not necessary. Prosser says: "It is entirely possible that a statute may im-
pose an absolute duty, for whose violation there is no recognized excuse. The legisla-
ture, within its constitutional powers, may see fit to place the burden of injuries 'upon
those who can measurably control their causes, instead of upon those who are in the
main helpless in that regard.' In such a case the defendant may become liable on the
mere basis of his violation of the statute. No excuse is recognized, and neither reason-
able ignorance nor all proper care will avoid liability. Such a statute falls properly
under the head of strict liability. . . . Thus the Federal Safety Appliance Act, regu-
lating the equipment of trains moving in interstate commerce, has been construed to
impose such an absolute duty, as have . . . various types of building regulations .. "
Prosser, Law of Torts 198 (3d ed. 1964). The problem with such an argument
is that courts are reluctant to impose absolute liability as a matter of law and normally
no such interpretation will be placed upon a statute unless the court finds that it was
clearly the purpose of the legislature. Negligence per se is easier to prove if the vio-
lation creates a hazard to the physical well being of the tenants. Lead poisoning
certainly meets this criterion. See Falick, A Tort Remedy for the Slum Tenant, 58
ill. B.J. 3 (Nov. 1969), in which the author argues that violation of a housing code
should be negligence per se.
32. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 12-5.1 (1969).
33. In a telephone call with Mr. A. Reifman of the Cook County State's Attor-
ney's office, on October 20, 1971, he stated to his knowledge no landlord had been
prosecuted for lead poisoning alone under this statute, although it is possible that such
landlords have been prosecuted for other violations.
34. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 121-1/2, § 80 (1967).
35. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 24, §§ 11-13-15 (1969).
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CONCLUSION
At present, in Illinois, it appears that the best approach to recover for
injuries to a child from lead poisoning, whether the injury occurs in the
private or common areas, is to use the duty owed a child under Rahn plus
violation of statute as evidence of neglect. This combination was used
successfully in Martin v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank,3 6 which was the first
Illinois case that went through a complete jury trial. The final settle-
ment in this case was limited by the wrongful death statute in effect at that
time. This is no longer a barrier in Illinois. Recoveries for wrongful death
in future cases involving lead poisoning should be much higher. Awards
can include actual pecuniary damages such as hospital, medical, and
funeral expenses, as well as pain and suffering experienced, plus punitive
damages. For a child who survives, awards should cover the amount of
money sufficient to care for a medically or physically handicapped victim for
the rest of his life.A7
Lawsuits in the private sector can do much to stir landlords into
compliance with local housing codes. Perhaps after several well-pub-
licized cases, insurance companies would insist that buildings be main-
tained in compliance with the lead poisoning ordinance before an insurance
policy is issued. Vigorous prosecution by private parties is a much needed
deterrent to lead poisoning in Illinois.
Also needed is vigorous prosecution by the state and city authori-
ties for code violations. The Illinois statute on Criminal Housing has
not been utilized at all to date in a lead poisoning case, although
45 children died in Chicago alone since its enactment. The Chicago Lead
Poisoning Ordinance is still fairly new and it is too early to say how
vigorously the Building Department will enforce the code. However,
the Building Department, no matter how alert, cannot detect all violations.
Even if it could, the hopelessly overcrowded Housing Court often makes
it easier and cheaper for the owners to pay the fines than to repair the build-
ings.
An alternative might be to take the burden from the governmental
authorities to prove a landlord is in violation of building laws and
shift the burden on the landlord to prove that he is not. Such a shift
could be accomplished by several means. One method might be requir-
ing landlords to secure a yearly license to rent, such as the license required
for food handlers, and which could be renewed only upon certification
by the Building Department that the structure meets code requirements.
36. No. 65-L-6584 (Cook County Cir. Ct. Aug. 18, 1970).
37. See Illinois Digest Vol. 11, 130(3) for guidelines as to the amount of money
required to care for an infant medically or physically damaged by lead for life.
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The purpose of licensing food handlers is to insure the health and safety
of citizens. The purpose of licensing landlords would be the same.
A second method of shifting the burden of compliance might be
to require a certificate from the Building Department that the dwelling
meets code regulations. The certificate would have to be produced be-
fore a building could be sold. A resolution along these lines was intro-
duced in the Chicago City Council on February 9, 1972 by Alderman
William Singer, but was limited to owners of private dwellings. The bill
has been in the Building and Zoning committee since its introduction.
Such a resolution, expanded to include all dwellings, could be an ef-
fective deterrent to lead poisoning. An owner would have to repair
before hoping to sell. Knowing this, he would not be as likely to let
the building deteriorate.
In time, the problem of residential lead poisoning will pass as the
buildings using the then legal lead paint are destroyed. In the meantime,
however, so will the lives of countless children. Most of all, we need more
public information. Many parents do not realize that eating paint chips
is dangerous to their children. Many doctors make the wrong diagnosis
because they do not know the symptoms of lead poisoning. An informed
public would be an aroused public. The deaths and injuries from lead
poisoning are utterly preventable.
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